Using Auctions in Agricultural Development Economics
February 16th, 2021
Professor Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, based on his experience and several peer-reviewed publications, summarizes the different types of auctions that can be used to gather data on revealed or stated preferences (willingness to pay). He also discusses when each is appropriate, how to setup and conduct auctions, and how to present and interpret findings. Several examples from the literature are reviewed (links below).
Mahmud, M., Gutierrez, I.A., Kumar, K.B. and Nataraj, S., 2020. What aspects of formality do Workers value? Evidence from a choice experiment in Bangladesh. The World Bank.
Prieto, S., Ricker-Gilbert, J., Bauchet, J. and Sall, M., 2019. Incomplete information and product quality in rural markets: Evidence from an experimental auction for maize in Senegal. Economic Development and Cultural Change.
Channa, H., Ricker-Gilbert, J., De Groote, H., Marenya, P. and Bauchet, J., 2018. Willingness to Pay for a new farm technology given Risk Preferences. Evidence from an experimental auction in Kenya. Papaer presented at the 2018 Triennial Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, Vancouver.